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ABSTRACT

Article 79 of the CISG provides that “[a] party is not liable for a
failure to perform any of his obligations” if the party has
encountered a certain impediment defined therein. It was once
depicted as “the Convention’s least successful part of the halfcentury of work.” It has been thirty years since the CISG took
effect. However, the interpretation of Article 79 is as old and
unsuccessful as ever. For one thing, it has long been interpreted
against our intuition, not to exempt a party from specific
performance claims. For another, the controversy has long
continued unsettled over whether a party could be exempted in the
so-called “hardship” cases. Lastly, where an event fundamentally
alters the equilibrium of the contract because of the increased cost
of performance, judges’ power to adapt the contract is urgently

* Professor of Law, Himeji-Dokkyo University, Japan (LL.M., Kyoto
University). I am profoundly indebted to late Professor Shinichiro Michida
(Rapporteur of the CISG at the Diplomatic Conference in 1980), who had
cordially instructed me while I was an undergraduate and LL.M. student at
Kyoto University. Thank you to the Pace International Law Review Editorial
Board for publishing and editing this article in skillful manners. Special thanks
to Joanna Kusio, Editor-in-Chief, for insightfully pinpointing the portions in
need of clarification.

331

1

ARTICLE 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

332

8/20/2018 12:47 PM

PACE INT’L L. REV.

[Vol. XXX] 2N

desired, but no reasonable basis in provisions of the CISG has been
suggested.
This article demonstrates that (1) Article 79 as a rule exempts a
party from specific performance claims, (2) the so-called
“hardship” cases are within the ambit of Article 79, and that (3)
judges can adapt contracts through what this author terms a
“reasonable expectation test.”
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ..................................................................................333
I. Damage Exemption ..................................................................336
II. Exemption of Specific Performance .......................................342
A. Discussion During the Drafting and Views of Major
Commentaries..............................................................342
B. Paragraphs (3) & (5) and Four Reasons for
Exemption of Performance..........................................347
III. Definitive Impossibility and a Causal Nexus with
Impediment ........................................................................352
A. Definitive Impossibility...............................................352
B. Impediment and a Causal Nexus .................................355
IV. Tacit Assumptions and the Reasonable Expectation Test .....357
A. Shared Tacit Assumptions...........................................357
B. The Reasonable Expectation Test ...............................359
V. The So-called “Hardship” Cases and Adaptation by the
Reasonable Expectation Test .............................................360
A. The So-called “Hardship” Cases .................................360
B. The Sunken Ship Case.................................................364
C. The Devalued Currency Case and Adaptation by the
Reasonable Expectation Test ......................................368
D. The Drastic Price Increase Case and the “Eisenberg
Formula”......................................................................372
VI. Judges’ Capacity to Adapt the Contract under the CISG ......378
VII. Conclusion ............................................................................381

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3

2

ARTICLE 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

8/20/2018 12:47 PM

CISG Article 79

333

INTRODUCTION

United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (“CISG”)1 provides for exemption
from contractual liabilities in cases of an unexpected impediment
beyond control in Article 79. Article 79 (1) prescribes:
A party is not liable for a failure to
perform any of his obligations if he
proves that the failure was due to an
impediment beyond his control and
that he could not reasonably be
expected to have taken the
impediment into account at the time
of the conclusion of the contract or
to have avoided or overcome it or its
consequences.2
Article 79(1) is said to be “one of the most complex and difficult in
the CISG,”3 and, therefore, one of the most controversial. For one,
although at first blush Article 79 gives the impression that it
exempts a failing party4 from his obligation to perform, it in fact
has been interpreted to allow for specific performance claims by
the other party.5 This puzzling interpretation has produced more
perplexing theories of exception to relieve the failing party from

1

United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988)
[hereinafter CISG].
2
Id. art. 79(1).
3
Harry M. Flechtner, The Exemption Provisions of the Sales
Convention, Including Comments on “Hardship” Doctrine and the 19 June
2009 Decision of the Belgian Cassation Court, 59 BELGRADE L. REV. 84, 84
(2011).
4
In this article, a “failing party” is a party who fails to perform due to
an impediment, and who may be exempted by Article 79.
5
In this article, “the other party” is the alternative party from the failing
party.
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his obligation to perform in certain situations.6 Second, in an
effort to justify judicial relief in these so called “hardship” cases,
various arguments have been made that tend to digress from the
letters of Article 79, which sometimes invoke provisions of law
other than the CISG.7 These theories and arguments appear to
have aggravated rather than settled the problems.
In order to enjoy the exemption by this provision, there
must be an impediment obstructing performance and a causal
relationship between the non-performance and the impediment.
The promisor must also meet the elements of what this author
terms the “four-prong test:” 1) the impediment that caused the
failure was beyond his control; 2) he could not reasonably be
expected to have taken it into account at the time of the conclusion
of the contract; 3) he could not reasonably be expected to have
avoided it or its consequences; 4) he could not reasonably be
expected to have overcome it or its consequences.8
Article 79 is an exception to the ancient principle pacta
sunt servanda, which means that a promise binds a promisor
because it is nothing less than what he himself has said of his own

6

See, e.g., INGEBORG SCHWENZER, SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER:
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS (CISG) ¶¶ 54-55, at 1150-51 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 4th ed. 2016)
[hereinafter SCHWENZER].
7
See id.
8
Article 79(1) provides that “he could not reasonably be expected . . .
to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences.” CISG, supra note 1, art.
79(1). It cannot be conclusively determined whether “expected to have
overcome” or “expected to overcome” is correct since the verb “overcome” has
the same form for the present tense and the past participle. The former is
probably grammatically correct. In this article, unless there is a need to clarify
the difference, the phrases are used interchangeably. Where the opportunity of a
failing party to overcome an impediment has continued to be given to him up to
the time of litigation, he could be “expected to overcome” it.
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free will.9 Thus, the ancient principle is based on the notion of the
freedom of contract or private autonomy.10 All of the above four
conditions of Article 79(1) operate to confirm that the promisor’s
free will has not played any role in the exonerating situation.11
In Chapter I, this article will argue that if the conventional
interpretation that Article 79 exempts a party only from damage
claims were to be correct, the provision would not be indispensable
and Article 74 could operate in its place. In Chapter II, the article
will demonstrate that there was a flaw in the discussions during the
drafting of Article 79, and that leading commentaries are in fact
compatible with this article’s interpretation that Article 79
9

See Ewoud Hondius & Hans Christoph Grigoleit, Introduction: An
approach to the issues and doctrines relating to unexpected circumstances, in
UNEXPECTED CIRCUMSTANCES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 3, 4 (Ewoud
Hondius & Hans Christoph Grigoleit eds., 2011) (“From a more general point of
view, pacta sunt servanda is one aspect of the notion of individual autonomy.
Under this idea individuals determine the rules governing their transactions by
consent. It is a prerequisite of the freedom of contract that the rules that are
consented to are binding on the relevant party as otherwise the agreement would
be of little more than moral value and the functioning of contractual exchange
would be endangered. Thus, freedom of contract corresponds with
responsibility.”).
10
U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE
U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, ¶
12,
at
43,
U.N.
Sales
No.
V.11-86558
(2012),
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/CISG-digest-2012-e.pdf (“According
to several courts, one of the general principles upon which the Convention is
based is party autonomy. According to one court, ‘the fundamental principle of
private autonomy is confirmed [in article 6;] it allows the parties to agree upon
provisions which derogate from the provisions of the Convention or even to
completely exclude its application with express and/or tacit agreement.’”).
11
See Hondius & Grigoleit, supra note 9, at 4 (“[I]t is not convincing to
attribute the responsibility for the consequences of unexpected circumstances
unilaterally to the burdened party based on the concept of pacta sunt servanda
because a strict allocation of all exceptional events cannot be based on an
autonomous act of contractual risk allocation.”); see also Brandon Nagy,
Unreliable Excuses: How do Differing Persuasive Interpretations of CISG
Article 79 Affect its Goal of Harmony?, 26 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 61, 71 (2013)
(“Article 79’s exemption establishes a limit to the no-fault regime inherent in the
CISG.”).

5
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excludes specific performance claims. Four reasons will justify
this interpretation. In Chapter III, the article will argue that the
theory which exceptionally exonerates a party from performance
when it is definitively impossible is wrongfully based on CISG
provisions. The Chapter will also define the word “impediment”
and the causal nexus between an impediment and a failure.
Chapter IV will explain that Article 79 is based on tacit
assumptions shared by parties that an impediment will not happen.
The article will also advance a “reasonable expectation test,”
which determines whether to exempt a party by asking whether a
“reasonable person” could expect the party to take an impediment
into account, avoid it, or overcome it. In Chapter V, this article
will apply the new theory to three types of “hardship” cases
frequently discussed in past discourses, and will show that the
“reasonable expectation test” can be utilized to adapt contracts.
Chapter V will also propound what this author has named the
“Eisenberg Formula” to be used when a dramatic and unexpected
rise in the costs of performance radically changes the equilibrium
of the contract. In Chapter VI, this article will elucidate that
judges presiding over CISG cases have been commonly adapting
contracts, and that the adaptation by the “reasonable expectation
test” is no aberration.
I.

DAMAGE EXEMPTION

At the beginning, Article 79 provides in paragraph (1) that
“[a] party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his
obligations if he proves [certain conditions].”12 At the end, it
provides in paragraph (5) that “[n]othing in this article prevents
either party from exercising any right other than to claim damages
under this Convention.”13 In essence, paragraphs (1) and (5) in
combination stipulate that a party is not liable for damages when
the failure is due to an impediment that satisfies the conditions
listed in paragraph (1), and that the other party can nevertheless
exercise other rights, including the right to require the failing party
12
13

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3

CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
Id. art. 79(5).
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to perform his contractual obligations. As Professor Schwenzer
explains:
In contrast to Article 74 of the
Convention relating to a Uniform
Law on the International Sale of
Goods, which not only excluded the
right to claim damages but also the
right to require specific performance
if the conditions were satisfied, the
CISG
generally
leaves
the
promisee’s right to require specific
performance unaffected according to
Article 79（5).14
This view is widely shared.15 However, reading Article 79 through
to the end, we may feel somewhat betrayed since reading
paragraph (1) makes us assume that a party is exempt from all of
the liabilities that may arise from his failure and that he is no
14

SCHWENZER, supra note 6, ¶ 53, at 1150 (citing Convention Relating
to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods art. 74, July 1, 1964, 834
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter ULIS]).
15
YESIM M. ATAMER ET AL., UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL
SALE
OF
GOODS
(CISG)
¶
16,
at
1061
(Stefan Kröll, Loukas Mistelis & Pilar Perales Viscasillas
eds.,
2001)
[hereinafter ATAMER] (“Art. 79(5) clearly states that an impediment beyond
control merely exempts the obligor from paying damages. The contract itself is
not dissolved by the fact that an obligation cannot be performed in a way
conforming to the contract due to an impediment, even if the impediment is of a
lasting nature. Therefore, the possibility to resort to any other remedy given
under the Convention and especially to make use of a claim for performance is
not precluded by Art. 79. This rule has been much debated and criticized, since,
unlike comparable national provisions, it is only concerned with the exclusion of
the claim for damages but does not take account of the fact that an impediment
beyond control may cause impossibility and therefore render a claim for specific
performance futile.”); see also BGH Nov. 27, 2007, X ZR 111/04, translated in
Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, CISG Case Presentation, PACE L. SCH. INST.
INT’L COM. L., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071127g1.html (last updated
June 6, 2013) (“Article 79 CISG releases the debtor only from damages claims
by the creditor. The creditor’s obligations to perform remain unaffected.”).

7

ARTICLE 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

338

PACE INT’L L. REV.

8/20/2018 12:47 PM

[Vol. XXX] 2N

longer obliged to perform. However, we end up with paragraph
(5) that brushes off our expectation for complete exemption.16
Professor Honnold feels the same way:
The statement in paragraph (5) that
nothing in Article 79 affects “any
right other than to claim damages”
could be read to say that a party who
is entitled to exemption from
damages could nevertheless be
“required to perform” . . . . This
conclusion would be inconsistent
with the basic provision that a party
“is not liable” when performance is
barred by an impediment. In many
cases an action to “require”
performance would call for an
impossibility and in other cases the
sanctions to compel performance . . .
could be at least as onerous as
damages. There is no indication that
the legislators intended such an
absurd result.17

16

Denis Tallon, Article 79, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION § 2.9, at 587-88 (Cesare
Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell eds., 1987) [hereinafter Tallon],
https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/tallon-bb79.html (“The effects of the
exemption are described in Article 79 in a most obscure and even contradictory
way. The title of section IV is of no avail: exemption from what? The principle
set forth in paragraph (1), which is copied from Article 74(1) of ULIS, is
worded in very general terms: the party ‘is not liable for a failure to perform.’
Paragraph (5), however, is an innovation and appears to restrain the effects of
the exemption to one remedy alone: damages.”).
17
JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES
UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION § 435.5, at 641 (Harry M.
Flechtner ed., 4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HONNOLD].

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3
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We would not be as disappointed at the very end and
realize that the exemption is limited to damages at the very
beginning if these two paragraphs were to be united: “A party is
not liable [in damages] for a failure to perform any of his
obligations if he proves that the failure was due to an impediment
beyond his control . . . .”18
The gist of Article 79 is that a party is not liable for
damages if he proves that the conditions described in paragraph (1)
are met.19 On the other hand, it is Article 74 of the CISG that
generally lays down the rules on damages:
Damages for breach of contract by
one party consist of a sum equal to
the loss, including loss of profit,
suffered by the other party as a
consequence of the breach. Such
damages may not exceed the loss
which the party in breach foresaw or
ought to have foreseen at the time of
the conclusion of the contract, in the
light of the facts and matters of
which he then knew or ought to have
known, as a possible consequence of
the breach of contract.20
In fact, the 1977 Sales Draft had provided: “If a party has not
performed one of his obligations, he is not liable in damages for such nonperformance if he proves that . . . .” However, during the review of the draft, the
committee “after deliberation, retained the proposal to delete the words ‘in
damages.’” JOHN O. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW
FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE STUDIES, DELIBERATIONS AND DECISIONS
THAT LED TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION WITH INTRODUCTIONS
AND EXPLANATIONS ¶¶ 432-37, at 349 (1989) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY].
19
Tallon, supra note 16, § 2.10, at 588 (“Paragraph (5), however,
provides that ‘nothing . . . prevents either party from exercising any right other
than to claim damages . . . .’ [W]hy then is Article 79 not included under the
section entitled ‘Damages’?”).
20
CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
18

9
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As far as damages are concerned, Article 79 might be
useless because Article 74 could play the role of Article 79. When
“an impediment beyond his control . . . that he could not
reasonably be expected to have taken . . . into account” under
Article 79(1)21 arises, the impediment and the loss ensuing from it
should be something other than what “the party in breach foresaw
or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the
contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew
or ought to have known.”22 Thus, the conclusion that he is not
liable for damages can be deduced from Article 74 without any
Article 79 intervention.
Against this argument, the following objection can be
made, although perhaps it may be an orthodox interpretation. As
Article 74 provides “as a possible consequence of the breach of
contract,” it deals with a breach that has already happened and it
does not care whether the breach was foreseeable or not. It is not
on the occurrence of a breach, but on the “amount and kind of
loss”23 caused by a breach that Article 74 imposes the requirement
of foreseeability. Foreseeability is not required for what kind of
“event” has caused such a breach and loss. For example, a crank
shaft of a mill broke, and the broken shaft was entrusted to a
common carrier to be sent to an engine manufacturer as a model
for making a new one, but due to the carrier’s neglect, the
transport of the model and the return of the new shaft took longer
than promised by the carrier, causing the mill to be shut down
longer than anticipated.24
In this case, foreseeability is not required concerning the
occurrence of the carrier’s neglect but concerning what kind of
“loss” would ensue from the breach by the common carrier. The
shutdown of the mill and the resulting loss of profit was not
21

Id. art. 79(1).
Id. art. 74.
23
Id.
24
Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 145.
22

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3
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necessarily foreseeable because there was a good possibility that
the mill had a spare shaft. Hence, the carrier would not be held
liable for damages in this case. Article 74 does not require
foreseeability as to the kind of “event” that has caused the breach
and loss—it does not care whether it be a traffic accident, an
employees’ strike, or an earthquake.
However, contrary to what may be the orthodox view of
Article 74 above, we could interpret it as requiring that the event
causing the breach must also be foreseeable. As Professor
Schlechtriem pointed out, the underlying idea of Article 74 is that
“the parties, at the conclusion of the contract, should be able to
calculate the risks and potential liability they assume by their
agreement.”25 It would be anomalous for the purpose of Article 74
to say that “in the light of the facts and matters of which he then
knew or ought to have known,” a loss arising from a breach has to
be foreseeable, but the events causing the loss need not be
foreseeable. The parties should be able to calculate the risks of
such events at the time of their agreement. Otherwise, a breaching
party should not be held liable for damages. In sum, Article 74
could in effect exempt a failing party from damage claims caused
by an unforeseeable impediment, in place of Article 79.26

25

PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, EXTENT AND MEASURE OF DAMAGES
(ARTICLES 74-76), reprinted in UNIFORM SALES LAW - THE UN-CONVENTION
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 96 (1986); see also
ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 2, at 1056 (“In fact, both provisions [Article 74 & 79]
are based on the same value judgment: contract parties should only be liable for
damages caused by risks they reasonably could take into account when
concluding the contract and therefore also when fixing the price.”).
26
Yet perfect substitution cannot be made, because Article 79 imposes
additional conditions concerning the reasonable expectation to avoid or
overcome an impediment. CISG, supra note 1, art. 79.
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EXEMPTION OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

A. Discussion During the Drafting and Views of Major Commentaries

It is clear that Article 79 is not indispensable to deny
damage claims in case of an unforeseeable impediment beyond
control. It may only perform a subsidiary function to clarify what
can be reasoned out by the interpretation of Article 74, thereby
foreclosing potential controversies. What can we do to save a
provision of the CISG, a product of marvelous efforts by
respectable scholars and experts?
According to one of the basic principles of legal
interpretation, an interpretation which gives intrinsic meanings to a
provision is preferable to one which undermines its raison d'etre.27
We must come up with those interpretations of Article 79 that will
rescue it from sterility. What degrades Article 79 to a fruitless
provision is the wrong interpretation of paragraph (5): “Nothing in
this article prevents either party from exercising any right other
than to claim damages under this Convention.”28 As pointed out
above, this paragraph is widely interpreted to retain the right to
demand specific performance.
Contrary to the conventional view, this author believes
paragraph (5) does not allow a party to exercise his right to specific
performance. Further, the root of “the likelihood that Article 79
may be the Convention’s least successful part of the half-century
of work towards international uniformity”29 partly lies in the
insufficient discussions over this provision during the drafting.
During the review of the Working Group “Sales” draft in 1977 by
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
See, e.g., University of Cambridge v. Bryer (1812) 16 East’s 317,
319 (“[T]he sound rule of construing any statute as indeed it is of construing any
instrument, whether it be statute, will, or deed, is to look into the body of the
thing to be construed, and to collect, as far as may be done, what is the intrinsic
meaning of the thing . . . .”).
28
CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(5).
29
HONNOLD, supra note 17, ¶ 432.1, at 627.
27
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(“UNCITRAL”), “the Committee was more evenly divided as to
whether [a party] should be able to exercise the remedy of specific
performance of the contract.”30 It decided that the remedy should
be maintained on the ground that “a temporary impediment would
cease and at such time a right to specific performance should not
be precluded.”31
At the Diplomatic Conference in 1980, a German
representative made a proposal that, in case of a permanent
impediment, specific performance should not be insisted.32
Unfortunately, this proposal was rejected.33 One might think that
this rejection offers a solid ground that a right to specific
performance is retained under Article 79. However, it is not so
solid when we scrutinize the opinions against the proposal. A
Russian representative objected to the proposal, insisting that:
[I]f a seller who had delivered a part
of the goods was unable, owing to
force majeure, to deliver the rest,
[and] if the buyer refused to pay for
the goods already delivered, without,
however, avoiding the contract, the
seller would be deprived, under the

30

Yearbook of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, [1977] 8 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 56-57, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1977;
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 455a, at 350: HONNOLD, supra note
17, ¶ 435.5, at 642, n.63.
31
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 455a, at 350 (emphasis
added).
32
See SCHWENZER, supra note 6, ¶ 53, at 1150.
33
Id. (“The German proposal that the wording should make clear that,
if the impediment were of a permanent nature, specific performance could not
be insisted on was rejected at the Vienna Conference because it was felt that, in
the case of actual impossibility, no problems would arise in practice, whereas
the categorical removal of the right to specific performance could impair the
promisee’s accessory rights.”); see also DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
18, ¶¶ 17-44, at 604-06.
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proposals . . . of the right to require
payment, which was unacceptable.34
There is some difficulty in making heads or tails of this opinion.
First, an impediment, or “force majeure,” prevented the seller’s
performance “to deliver the rest.” Therefore, it should be the
buyer’s right to require the seller to perform which matters in this
context. However, the problem is switched to the seller’s “right to
require payment” by the buyer. This example does not refer to any
impediment to block the payment by the buyer. In addition, it
seems to be based on the premise that the goods already delivered
(e.g., 30 units delivered out of 100 units contracted for) can be
utilized independently, and that they can be charged and paid for
separately from those undelivered. This author could find no
reason why the seller would be deprived of the right to require
payment.
A Swedish representative objected that:
[A]lthough a party which was unable
to perform owing to an impediment
was not required to pay damages, it
should not for that reason be content
to wait until the impediment had
disappeared. It had a duty to make
all possible efforts to overcome the
impediment and its consequences
and to perform the contract.35
This opinion also contradicts the language of Article 79, as finally
adopted. That the party is in the position “to make all possible
efforts to overcome the impediment and its consequences and to
perform the contract” implies that the party is reasonably expected
to overcome the impediment. Therefore, we cannot possibly say
that “he could not reasonably be expected to . . . overcome it, or its
34
35

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3
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consequences.”36 Thus, his hypothetical fails to satisfy one of the
conditions of Article 79. The Swedish representative did not have
to worry about his hypothetical situation, because the party in it
could not be exempted from his obligation to perform or from his
liability to damages.
It should be noted that the opinion of the Committee quoted
above—“a temporary impediment would cease and at such time a
right to specific performance should not be precluded”37—in fact
suggests that Article 79 does bar the remedy to require
performance during a temporary impediment. After “a temporary
impediment would cease,” no impediment exists which satisfies
the conditions of Article 79(1) and the failing party is no longer
exempt from his obligation to perform. The opinion conversely
implies that so long as an impediment persists, the other party
cannot demand a specific performance.
The leading commentary by Professor Honnold explains
that:
[T]he broad language of paragraph
(5) was retained because of the
possibility that remedies other than
damages might be needed in special
circumstances, such as the ending of
a temporary impediment or failure to
pay the price for goods received
when the agreed mode of payment
was blocked temporarily (e.g.) by
exchange controls.38
36
37

CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 455a, at 350 (emphasis

added).
38

HONNOLD, supra note 17, § 435.5, at 642 (emphasis added).
Professor Honnold himself agreed with the German proposal. See
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 38, at 606. (“The very slight change
proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany would make the text consistent
and prevent abuse.”).
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While the payment is being blocked temporarily by exchange
controls, the buyer is not required to perform. After the block is
lifted, there exists no impediment defined in Article 79(1).
Therefore, the buyer is no longer exempt, the payment is required
by Article 53,39 and the seller can require the buyer to pay the price
according to Article 62.40
Another leading commentary edited by Professor
Schwenzer also maintains: “Upholding the right to claim specific
performance where a promisor has gained exemption under Article
79 is entirely sensible if performance remains possible at a later
point in time, by repair or delivery of substitute goods, etc.”41 That
“performance remains possible at a later point in time, by repair or
delivery of substitute goods” means that after that later point the
impediment for which the seller has once gained exemption is no
longer beyond his control and that he can overcome its
consequences. In other words, after the point there exists no
impediment satisfying the conditions of Article 79(1), because the
seller can “reasonably be expected to . . . overcome it or its
consequences.”42 Accordingly, the seller is no longer exempt, and
is required to make repairs or to deliver substitute goods under

39
See CISG, supra note 1, art. 53 (“The buyer must pay the price for
the goods and take delivery of them as required by the contract and this
Convention.”).
40
Id. art. 62 (“The seller may require the buyer to pay the price, take
delivery or perform his other obligations, unless the seller has resorted to a
remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement.”).
41
SCHWENZER, supra note 6, ¶ 53, at 1150 (emphasis added).
42
CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
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Article 46.43 Hence, this ratiocination also conversely suggests
that so long as a qualified impediment continues, the promisor is
not required to perform.
B. Paragraphs (3) & (5) and Four Reasons for Exemption of Performance

Paragraph (3) of Article 79 explicitly provides: “The
exemption provided by this article has effect for the period during
which the impediment exists.”44 It unequivocally enunciates that
the exemption loses effect when the impediment ceases to exist.
Apparently, the prevailing interpretation of paragraph (5) has
bothered to expatiate on it only to conclude what paragraph (3)
manifestly announces. Paragraph (3) seems to set out a matter of
course, because after “the period during which the impediment
exists” is over, no impediment exists satisfying the conditions of
paragraph (1). It is natural that the exemption should lose effect.
Again, we must come up with an interpretation which gives this
provision an inherent raison d’etre. For this purpose, “the
exemption” provided at the beginning of paragraph (3) must be
interpreted as “the exemption from the obligation to perform.”
The nub of the paragraph is that the obligation to perform will
“revive” after the impediment. Even if a performance is once
interrupted and exempted by an impediment, such rights as
guaranteed by Articles 46 (requiring the seller to perform)45 and 62
(requiring the buyer to pay)46 will survive it. In other words, the
Id. art. 46. “(1) The buyer may require performance by the seller of
his obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent
with this requirement. (2) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the
buyer may require delivery of substitute goods only if the lack of conformity
constitutes a fundamental breach of contract and a request for substitute goods is
made either in conjunction with notice given under article 39 or within a
reasonable time thereafter. (3) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the
buyer may require the seller to remedy the lack of conformity by repair, unless
this is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances. A request for repair
must be made either in conjunction with notice given under article 39 or within a
reasonable time thereafter.” Id.
44
Id. art. 79(3).
45
Id. art. 46.
46
Id. art. 62.
43
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failing party cannot refuse to perform after the impediment, by
asserting that once exempted, he will be exempted for good.47
On the other hand, this interpretation does not apply to the
damage exemption. Damage claims should not “revive” after the
impediment. The exemption from claims for damages caused by
the delay during the impediment will last forever. Otherwise, the
exemption would be meaningless, or it would only grant a grace
period.48 The failing party may be requested to perform after the
impediment and may perform belatedly, but the other party is still
prevented from making a damage claim for the delay during the
impediment.49 This interpretation is congruent with the fact that
exercising the right to claim damages is an exception under Article
79(5).50
The pivotal question is whether the other party can demand
specific performance during the period when the impediment

47

See Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, Guide to CISG Article 79:
Secretariat Commentary (closest counterpart to an Official Commentary) ¶ 14,
PACE
L.
SCH.
INST.
INT’L
COM.
L.,
https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-79.html (last updated
Aug. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Guide to CISG Article 79] (“However, if the
contract was not avoided by the other party, the contract continues in existence
and the removal of the impediment reinstates the obligations of both parties
under the contract.”); see also ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 27, at 1065
(“According to Art. 79(3) the obligor is only exempt from paying damages for
the duration of the impediment. If in that time-span specific performance is also
barred since, for example, export from the country where the specific goods are
coming from is stopped due to a plague, the buyer can only claim performance
again once the ban is lifted. The performance claim is suspended.”).
48
This is also true of the damages claims to non-conformities caused
by an impediment. See ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 12, at 1059-60 (referencing
applicability of Article 79 to defective delivery).
49
Needless to say, a failing party is not exempt from the damages
which he causes after the impediment (e.g., he is procrastinating his
performance even after the impediment has been eliminated). It is a matter of
course that such damages should not be exempted, and they are out of the sphere
of Article 79 in the first place.
50
CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(5).
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persists. As is often pointed out,51 Article 79(5) saves the other
party’s right to avoid the contract (Articles 49 and 64) and to
reduce the price (Article 50) by announcing that it does not
“prevent either party from exercising any right other than to claim
damages.”52 As stated above, it is also interpreted to allow for
specific performance claims, and contrary to this conventional
view, it does not for the following four reasons.
First is the fundamental linguistic reason derived from the
letters of Article 79(1) itself, which says, “a party is not liable for a
failure to perform any of his obligations.”53 The CISG itself does
not have a clause that glosses the terms used in its provisions. In
addition, when we are engaged in the “interpretation of this
Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to
the need to promote uniformity in its application,”54 and we must
not resort to the usages of local judiciary. A commonly-used
dictionary, such as the Oxford English Dictionary (“OED”), could
be consulted. It defines the word “liable” as “bound or obliged by

See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 17, § 435.5, at 642, n.64 (“The
language that became CISG 79(5) was prepared during UNCITRAL’s 1977
review (in a Committee of the Whole) of the Working Group Draft. There was
‘general agreement that’ [under this provision the party expecting performance]
‘should have the right to avoid the contract if the failure to perform amounted to
a fundamental breach’ and that ‘he should have the right to reduce the price in
appropriate circumstances.’ (This right would be appropriate if the seller, after
an excused delay, delivered defective goods.))”; see also DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 455a, at 350; SCHWENZER, supra note 6, ¶¶ 56-57, at
1151-52.
52
CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(5); see also id. arts. 49, 64; see also id.
art. 50 (“If the goods do not conform with the contract and whether or not the
price has already been paid, the buyer may reduce the price in the same
proportion as the value that the goods actually delivered had at the time of the
delivery bears to the value that conforming goods would have had at that time.
However, if the seller remedies any failure to perform his obligations in
accordance with article 37 or article 48 or if the buyer refuses to accept
performance by the seller in accordance with those articles, the buyer may not
reduce the price.”).
53
CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
54
Id. art. 7(1).
51
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law or equity, or in accordance with a rule or convention.”55 A
“failure to perform” means that the party has not performed.
Hence, Article 79(1) says a party is not “bound or obliged” to
perform any of his obligations under the contract even if he has not
performed when he has encountered an impediment defined. It
would not make any sense at all if a provision were to read: “A
party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations
and yet is bound to perform it.”
There is more to buttress this conclusion. That is,
paragraph (1) of Article 79 governs all four paragraphs following
it. Paragraph (2) relies on paragraph (1) for its definition (“he is
exempt under the preceding paragraph”); the word “exemption
provided by this article” in paragraph (3) is the exemption in
paragraph (1); and the “impediment” in paragraph (4) is the
impediment defined in paragraph (1).56 Therefore, the clear
command of paragraph (1) that a “party is not liable for a failure to
perform” infiltrates down to paragraph (5).57 Paragraph (5) retains
only those remedies which are consistent with forbearance of
claiming specific performances (i.e., avoidance of contract and
reduction of price). It is antiparallel to Article 46(1), which
provides: “The buyer may require performance by the seller of his
obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is

55

Liable, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989).
Id. art. 79(1)-(4).
57
Article 38 can be spotlighted as another example that illustrates that
paragraph (1) functions as a general provision for the following paragraphs.
Article 38(1) provides: “The buyer must examine the goods, or cause them to be
examined, within as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances.” The
effect of paragraph (1) is acting on paragraph (2), which provides: “If the
contract involves carriage of the goods, examination may be deferred until after
the goods have arrived at their destination.” The deferred examination after
arriving at the new destination does not have to be made as soon as possible, but
can be made “within as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances.”
The same is true of paragraph (3). See Yasutoshi Ishida, CISG Art. 38 & 39 and
Japanese Commercial Code Article 526―Examination of Goods and Notice of
Non-conformity: “One Month No Prejudice” Test, 56 HIMEJI L. REV. 1, 6-7
(2015) (citing CISG, supra note 1, art. 38).
56
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inconsistent with this requirement.”58 The “remedy” mentioned in
this provision is the same as “any right” mentioned in Article
79(5), i.e., avoidance and reduction of the price.59 Thus, Article
46(1) clearly reveals that the right to avoid contract and to reduce
price are “inconsistent with” the requirement of performance.
Third, even if a failing party were to be required to perform
while the impediment continued, there would be virtually no
remedy for the other party to resort to if the failing party refused.
In all probability, he will refuse, but so long as the conditions of
Article 79(1) are satisfied, no damages can be claimed for his
refusal to perform. Domestic laws may have various provisions to
enforce performance. However, they are subject to Article 28 of
the CISG,60 and they might be inconsistent with the damage
exemption. In addition, it is doubtful whether their efficacy is
worthy of the litigation costs involved in the international context.
Therefore, the retention of the right to claim performance is
illusory, without any enforceable endorsement.
Lastly, it is simply “unreasonable” to force a failing party
to perform while a qualified impediment continues. When a
failing party is exempt under Article 79(1), there is an impediment
which “he could not reasonably be expected to have . . .
overcome.”61 Forcing him to overcome what he could not

58

CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(1) (emphasis added).
See Guide to CISG Article 79, supra note 47.
60
CISG, supra note 1, art. 28 (“If, in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention, one party is entitled to require performance of any obligation
by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgement for specific
performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar
contracts of sale not governed by this Convention.”).
61
Id. art. 79(1).
59
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reasonably be expected to overcome is clearly unreasonable, and
even folderol.62
III.

DEFINITIVE IMPOSSIBILITY AND A CAUSAL NEXUS WITH
IMPEDIMENT

A. Definitive Impossibility

Even those who maintain that Article 79(5) allows for
specific performance claims concede that, as an exception, they are
precluded in case of definitive impossibility, such as a permanent
ban on the import of the contracted goods. That is, although
Article 79(5) admits specific performance claims as a rule, it does
not when the performance is rendered totally, physically, and
definitively impossible, because a claim for specific performance
in such a case would be meaningless. Professor Tallon explains:
The restrictive interpretation of
paragraph (5) according to which the
defaulting party is exempted only
from liability for damages -- is least
acceptable
when
the
nonperformance
is
total
and
definitive. . . . The right of the
injured party to claim specific
performance or avoidance does not
make sense any more. Specific
performance is, by definition,
impossible.63

62
See Harry Flechtner, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The
Homeward Trend and Exemption for Delivering Non-Conforming Goods, 19
PACE INT’L L. REV. 29, 43 (2007) (“But how can a party be forced to perform
when it has shown, as required for exemption under Article 79, that an
impediment has rendered its performance impossible (or, at the very least, so
extraordinarily difficult as to satisfy the very strict standard for exemption)?”).
63
Tallon, supra note 16, § 2.10.2, at 589-90.
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Professor Atamer points out this conclusion is drawn from
provisions other than that of Article 79(5). She argues that,
regardless of an impediment, the question of whether a specific
performance claim is granted or not should be governed by the
provisions specifically addressing performance:
Even if the obligor is responsible for
e.g. the loss of any specific goods as
there was a foreseeable and
controllable impediment, or even if
he has intentionally destroyed these
goods, a claim for specific
performance cannot be granted. The
existence of a performance claim is
independent from the fact of whether
non-performance can be imputed to
the obligor or not. Therefore, it is
not correct to search under Art. 79
for an answer to the question of
whether specific performance can
still be claimed. This question has to
be answered by looking at Arts 46
and 62, which are the main
provisions regarding the remedy of
specific performance.64
Perhaps Professor Atamer is right when she says that “it is
not correct to search under Art. 79.”65 However, following her
instruction and searching Article 46(1), all we find is: “The buyer
may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the
buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this
requirement.”66 As explained in Section B of Chapter II above, the
“unless” clause is designed for such a case as where the buyer has

64

ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 18, at 1062.
Id.
66
CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(1).
65
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declared the contract avoided or has reduced the price.67 The
clause does not seem to connote the idea that specific performance
is unavailable where it is impossible. One interpretation, however,
explains: “[T]he limit to the specific performance claim can be
deduced from Art. 46(1) itself since it blocks such a claim
whenever it is ‘inconsistent’ with another remedy the obligee has
resorted to. To claim the impossible is inconsistent with the
specific performance claim itself.”68
This interpretation is wrong. The “unless” clause of Article
46(1) says, “the buyer has resorted to a remedy [X] which is
inconsistent with this requirement [Y].” When we say “X is
inconsistent with Y,” X and Y are different things independent of
each other. So, “a remedy [X]” in the “unless” clause must be a
remedy other than “this requirement,” i.e., the requirement of
specific performance [Y]. In this respect, the first sentence quoted
above appears to maintain consistency in saying, “whenever it [Y
= such a claim = specific performance claim] is ‘inconsistent’ with
another remedy [X] . . . .” In the second sentence, however, this
“another remedy [X]” is transformed into “the specific
performance claim [Y],” the very same remedy. This selfcontradiction is a product of the result-orientated efforts to forcibly
inject the impossibility theory into Article 46(1). Admittedly, this
provision is meant for an inconsistent situation where, for example,
“the buyer declares the contract avoided (e.g., ‘I avoid: Don’t ship
the goods’) and later demands performance: ‘Ship the goods.’”69 It
is equally wrong to search within Article 46.
We need not invoke a provision of the CISG to say “it is
impossible to perform what is impossible to perform.” It is not so
much a matter of legal interpretation as a matter of course that
what cannot be done cannot be done. A contrary assertion would
be irrational. For instance, it would ruin the integrity of the CISG
67

See Guide to CISG Article 79, supra note 47.
ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 34, at 1067 (citing the works by Dr. Ivo
Bach & Düchs).
69
HONNOLD, supra note 17, § 282.1, at 411.
68
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if one of its provisions were to provide that “the buyer may require
the seller to perform even if it is impossible.” Every law is based
on some axioms even though it does not expressly provide for
them. That we cannot perform the impossible is such an axiom.70
The arguments on impossibility, although dwelt upon
above, are in fact unnecessary for the new theory that Article 79
does bar specific performance claims.
Impossible or not,
performance is excused if the conditions of Article 79 are met. In
other words, Article 79 is not a provision for a case where
performance has become impossible. Performance need not
become definitively impossible for a party to enjoy exemption.71
All it requires is that “the failure was due to an impediment.”72
Even when the performance is still possible, a party might fail to
perform simply because the performance becomes very difficult or
onerous due to an impediment.
It is now time to discuss the rudimentary question of when
a party is exempted from performance and damage claims.
B. Impediment and a Causal Nexus

Article 79(1) requires the failure to be “due to an
impediment.”73 As such, it is necessary to clarify what “an
Article 82(1) provides that the “buyer loses the right to declare the
contract avoided . . . if it is impossible for him to make restitution of the goods
substantially in the condition in which he received them.” CISG, supra note 1,
art. 82(1). Professor Atamer refers to Article 82 as one of the two provisions of
CISG using the term ‘impossibility’ and explains that its “underlying ratio is that
the impossible cannot be delivered.” See ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 34, at 106768.
71
Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, CISG-AC Opinion No. 7,
Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG, op. 3.1,
PACE L. SCH. INST. INT’L COM. L., https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISGAC-op7.html (last updated Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter AC Opinion] (“The
language of Article 79 does not expressly equate the term ‘impediment’ with
an event that makes performance absolutely impossible.”).
72
CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
73
Id. (emphasis added).
70
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impediment” actually means in this provision. The phrase was
deliberately chosen to avoid “the use of various familiar domestic
legal
terms—such
as
force
majeure,
wegfall
der
geschäftsgrundlage,
eccessiva
onerosità
sopravvenuta,
impossibility, and impracticability—in favor of ‘terminology
neutrality.’”74 Therefore, again, it would be best to consult the
OED to search for a definition not tainted by local legal usages.
The OED defines an “impediment” as “something that impedes,
hinders, or obstructs.”75 A so-called “hardship” situation, which
will be discussed later in Section A of Chapter V, is qualified as an
impediment according to this definition.76 One might suspect that
a simple definition of a dictionary such as this will not work as an
interpretive criterion for a provision of the Convention. It will,
however, suffice because exhaustive modifiers following the word,
such as “beyond his control” and “not reasonably be expected . . .
to have avoided,” function as an elaborate annotation of “an
impediment” and tailor the ambit of the word more narrowly than
any other possible definition.77
The same is true of the phrase “due to” in Article 79(1).78
According to the OED, “due to” has the same meaning as “owing
to,” which is defined as “caused by.”79 If paraphrased, “the failure
was due to an impediment” becomes “the failure was caused by an
impediment.”
Therefore, Article 79(1) requires a causal
relationship between the failure and the impediment. If the “due
to” connotes a “but for” nexus, almost everything can be “due to
74

Nagy, supra note 11, at 64.
Impediment, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
76
ROLF KOFOD, HARDSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL SALES CISG AND THE
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES 3.1.2 (Univ. of Copenhagen-Faculty of Law ed. 2011),
https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kofod.html (“By avoiding reference
to hardship or any other similar concept such as force majeure, frustration or
wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, the term ‘impediment’ manages to summarise
these principles under one provision by a rather elastic wording.”).
77
CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
78
Id.
79
Due to, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989); owing to,
supra.
75
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an impediment.” For instance, a seller was absorbed in checking
the latest news of a big earthquake, which took place in a
neighboring province, and forgot to reserve a ship for the
transportation of the contracted goods, causing the delivery to be
delayed. “But for” the earthquake, the delivery would not have
been delayed. If “due to” connotes a nexus similar to the
“proximate cause” used in tort law, it may confine the range of
relevant impediments within some intelligible instances. However,
a quest for an appropriate level of nexus is unnecessary, because
whatever the level may be, the exhaustive modifiers of “an
impediment” enumerated in Article 79(1) will adequately tailor
qualified impediments in terms of causal relationship, as well. For
example, in our forgetful seller hypothetical above, we cannot
possibly say that “he could not reasonably be expected . . . to have
avoided . . . its consequences”80 (i.e., his absorption into the news
of the earthquake and the delayed delivery), and hence he is not
exempted.
IV.

TACIT ASSUMPTIONS AND THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION TEST
A. Shared Tacit Assumptions

When parties negotiate for and conclude a contract, both
share many tacit assumptions. They may vary from “the sun will
rise tomorrow again” to “the crude oil price will be steady during
the one-month life of the contract.” They are a part of a contract in
that the parties would not have made the contract or would have
agreed otherwise if they had been fully aware that the assumed
situations would not come about (“the sun will not rise tomorrow”
or “the crude oil price will sky-rocket in a month”). They are basic
conditions of a contract, but are simply too basic to merit attention
or mention. Professor Eisenberg reminds us of what we may have
somewhere in the back of our mind:
Shared tacit assumptions . . . are just
as much a part of a contract as
80

CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
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explicit terms, so that where the risk
of an unexpected circumstance
would have been shifted away from
the promisor if the assumption had
been made explicit, an otherwise
identical shared tacit assumption
should operate in the same way.
This approach to shared tacit
assumptions is an application of the
usual
hypothetical-contract
methodology,
under
which
unspecified terms are usually
determined on the basis of what the
contracting parties probably would
have agreed to if they had addressed
the relevant issue.81
The notion of shared tacit assumptions has much to do with
Article 79. The Article comes into play when parties had
commonly assumed the non-occurrence of an impediment at the
time of the conclusion of the contract but it did, in fact, happen.
The very reason why a failing party is exempt is that he and the
other party would not have made a contract or would have agreed
otherwise if they had actually foreseen an impediment and
explicitly addressed the issue.
However, Article 79(1) focuses on the tacit assumption
only of the failing party (not of the other party), and it demands
reasonableness for not having assumed or foreseen the
impediment, and for not taking measures to avoid or overcome the
impediment. The tacit assumption of the other party is inferred by
the “reasonable expectation test,” which will be considered next.

81

Melvin Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 207, 214 (2009).
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B. The Reasonable Expectation Test

In defining a qualified impediment, Article 79(1) uses a
unique phrase: “could not reasonably be expected to have . . . .”82
In all of the provisions of the CISG, the word “reasonable” is used
34 times, while “reasonably” is used twice.83 It can safely be said
that reasonableness has a status as one of “the general principles”
on which the Convention is based.84 It may be a universal legal
criterion. However, it is a highly context-dependent concept, and
we must consider its meaning in the context of the CISG and
Article 79.
Article 8, a general provision governing the
interpretation of statements and conduct of parties, sheds light on
the connotation. Article 8(2) provides that “statements made by
and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the
understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the
other party would have had in the same circumstances.”85 This
provision formulates a so-called “reasonable person” standard.
The standard is applicable to Article 79 situations because whether
a party could reasonably be expected to do X depends on the
interpretation of his conduct.86 Paragraph (3) facilitates the
determination of the “reasonable person’s” understanding by
providing, “[i]n determining the intent of a party or the
understanding a reasonable person would have had, due
consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the
case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties

82

CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1) (emphasis added).
The word “unreasonable” is used 13 times. See generally id.
84
See id. art. 7(2); see also Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database,
Reasonableness: Overview comments, PACE L. SCH. INST. INT’L COM. L.,
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071127g1.html (last updated Jan. 23, 2001).
85
CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
86
In fact, ULIS in Article 74 entitled “Exemption” explicitly adopted a
“reasonable person” standard. It provides that a party can prove the intention of
the parties not to be bound in case of an impediment, and that “in the absence of
any expression of the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to what
reasonable persons in the same situation would have intended.” ULIS, supra
note 14, art. 74 (emphasis added).
83
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have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent
conduct of the parties.”87
If we incorporate the “reasonable person” standard of
Article 8 into Article 79, we end up with the following test:
“whether a reasonable person in the shoes of the [failing party],
under the actual circumstances at the time of the conclusion of the
contract and taking into account trade practices”88 could expect the
failing party to have taken the impediment into account or to have
avoided or overcome it or its consequences. This article calls this
the “reasonable expectation test,” and refers to a reasonable person
described therein simply as a “reasonable person.”
V.

THE SO-CALLED “HARDSHIP” CASES AND ADAPTATION BY THE
REASONABLE EXPECTATION TEST
A. The So-called “Hardship” Cases

Past discussions on Article 79 are based on the preposition
that in principle it allows for specific performance claims. 89 It
would be better here to test our new theory, which denies specific
performance claims, by applying it to hypotheticals utilized in the
past discourses. The most formidable controversy has been
focused on the so-called “hardship” cases.
According to
Professor Lindstrom, “[t]he question whether situations of hardship

87

CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3).
SCHWENZER, supra note 6, ¶ 14, at 1134.
89
But see Ingeborg Schwenzer, Wider Perspective: Force Majeure and
Hardship in International Sales Contracts, 39 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L.
REV. 709, 720 (2009) (“[N]owadays it seems to be undisputed that, wherever the
right to claim performance would undermine the obligor’s exemption,
performance cannot be demanded as long as the impediment exists. This rule not
only applies, for example, to cases of actual impossibility of performance, but
also to cases of hardship.”).
88
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are governed by Article 79 is one of the most difficult and most
discussed questions concerning the Article.”90
The CISG itself does not have any provision concerning
“hardship” situations. The UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts (“UNIDROIT Principles”)91 in Article 6.2.2
defines hardship in the following way:
There is hardship where the
occurrence of events fundamentally
alters the equilibrium of the contract
either because the cost of a party’s
performance has increased or
because the value of the performance
a party receives has diminished, and
(a) the events occur or become
known to the disadvantaged party
after the conclusion of the contract;
(b) the events could not reasonably
have been taken into account by the
disadvantaged party at the time of
the conclusion of the contract; (c) the
events are beyond the control of the
disadvantaged party; and (d) the risk
of the events was not assumed by the
disadvantaged party. 92

90

Niklas Lindström, Changed Circumstances and Hardship in the
International Sale of Goods, NORDIC J. COM. L. 1, 12 (2006),
http://njcl.dk/articles/2006-1/commentary1.pdf.
91
See generally Amin Dawwas, Alteration of the Contractual
Equilibrium Under the UNIDROIT Principles, PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE
COMPANION, Dec. 2010, at 1.
92
Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Priv. L. [UNIDROIT], UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010, art. 6.2(2) (Dec. 2,
2013),
https://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralver
sionprinciples2010-e.pdf.
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Article 6.2.3 provides for the effects of hardship. It
authorizes the disadvantaged party to request renegotiation of the
other party, and for the court to terminate the contract or adapt it
with a view to restoring its equilibrium.93
During
the
review
of
the
Working
Group
“Sales” draft in 1977 by United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), an article governing
hardship situations was proposed. It stated:
If, as a result of special events which
occurred after the conclusion of the
contract and which could not have
been foreseen by the parties, the
performance of its stipulations
results in excessive difficulties or
threatens
either
party
with
considerable damage, any party so
affected has a right to claim an
adequate amendment of the contract
or its termination.94
This would have enabled a party facing hardship to modify
or terminate the contract in a manner similar to that prescribed by

93

Id. art. 6.2.3. Art. 6.2.3 provides:
(1) In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request
renegotiations. The request shall be made without undue delay and shall indicate
the grounds on which it is based.
(2) The request for renegotiation does not in itself entitle the disadvantaged
party to withhold performance.
(3) Upon failure to reach agreement within a reasonable time either party may
resort to the court.
(4) If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable,
(a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed; or
(b) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium. Id.
94
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 18, ¶ 458, at 350.
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However, the “Committee did not

It is suggested that this rejection of the proposal attests that
CISG has no room for “hardship” cases.96 However, “such history
evidences that the discussions were not conclusive on this
question,”97 and the rejection is susceptible to various
interpretations.
To logically interpret Article 79, it should be discouraged
to discuss whether the Article is applicable to a “hardship” cases.
Unlike the UNIDROIT Principles, the CISG does not have a
provision defining “hardship” situations.98 If we attempt to
delineate a hardship for the purpose of applying Article 79, it is
likely to become over-inclusive and under-inclusive, as compared
to the ambit of Article 79. In other words, “[w]herever one cuts
the seamless web there will be loose ends,”99 and short ends. Even
if a case governed by the CISG happens to fit the definition of
Article 6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles, such remedies as
provided in Article 6.2.3 are not readily available under the CISG.
Therefore, we should directly discuss whether an obstacle involved
in a specific case, which might or might not fall in a so-called
“hardship” situation, as defined in Article 6.2.2, should be
characterized as “an impediment” governed by Article 79,
satisfying its enumerated conditions.
In case of an economic
hardship, such as where a dramatic and unexpected rise in the costs
of performance radically changes the equilibrium of the contract, it
is often advocated that the performance needs to be “excessively

95

Id. ¶ 460, at 350.
See, e.g., Scott D. Slater, Overcome by Hardship: The Inapplicability
of The Unidroit Principles’ Hardship Provisions to CISG, 12 FLA. J. INT’L L.
231, 259-60 (1998).
97
AC Opinion, supra note 71, cmt. 30.
98
See generally CISG, supra note 1.
99
Barry Nicholas, Force Majeure and Frustration, 27 AM. J. COMP. L.
231, 232 (1979), https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas.html.
96
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(extremely) onerous” to justify judicial relief.100 However, for the
same reasons as not to define the “hardship” situations, it would be
better not to introduce another criterion apart from the letters of
Article 79. This author believes that the “reasonable expectation
test” concerning overcoming an impediment can play the same role
as the standard of extreme onerousness (i.e., whether a failing
party could reasonably be expected to have overcome the
impediment).
Generally speaking, the performance in the so-called
“hardship” situations is physically possible (or not totally and
definitively impossible), albeit it is very difficult, and, therefore,
according to the conventional view of Article 79, the promisor
cannot be exempted from his obligation to perform. This is why a
proposal, which would have allowed for the adaptation or
termination of contract, was made during the review of the draft,
and why the Advisory Council Opinion No.7 insinuates the
possibility of the adaptation of contract under Article 79.101
However, under our new theory, specific performance claims are
precluded if a “hardship” case meets the conditions of Article 79.
B. The Sunken Ship Case

The first case that epitomizes a hardship situation is a
salvage case.
Seller agreed to sell and Buyer agreed to buy a picture
painted by an artist, who had died 5 years before. The ship
transporting it has sunk together with the picture, but fortunately
the picture itself remains intact in the hold of the ship. The price

100

See, e.g., AC Opinion, supra note 71, op. 3.1; ATAMER, supra note
15, ¶ 81, at 1090.
101
AC Opinion, supra note 71, cmt. 40 (“CISG Article 79(5) may be
relied upon to open up the possibility for a court or arbitral tribunal to determine
what is owed to each other, thus ‘adapting’ the terms of the contract to the
changed circumstances.”).
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of the picture is 55 thousand dollars, but the costs of salvage are
enormous. Buyer sues Seller for specific performance.
Because under our new theory Article 79 exempts a failing
party from his obligation to perform if he encounters a qualified
impediment, the conclusion that Seller is not required to salvage
the ship can be reached by the simple application of the letters of
Article 79(1). It can be easily acknowledged that the sinking of the
ship carrying the goods is “an impediment beyond [Seller’s]
control.”102 It can also be admitted that “he could not reasonably
be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time
of the conclusion of the contract.”103 The OED defines the phrase
to “take into account” as “to take into consideration as an existing
element, to notice.”104 Ordinarily, parties to a sales contract do not
take into consideration the possibility that the ship carrying the
goods will sink as a factor which must be embodied in their
contract. In the words of our analysis, they do not “assume” that
the ship will sink, or they share a tacit assumption that the ship will
not sink. Therefore, they do not bother to arrange for the
catastrophe, because it will cost them time and trouble, which are
most likely doomed to be wasted. If they really believe the ship is
likely to sink, they will never make a contract involving the ship.
Of course, everything could be foreseeable and expected,
including a prophecy that “a meteorite might strike our ship,” in
the sense that we could not conclusively assert that it will never
happen in the future. It is a matter of a degree of probability. In
the business world, there are many sophisticated contracts
containing elaborate clauses for mishaps. However, as far as such
a clause is concerned, such risks are beyond the scope of the CISG,

CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1). Professor Atamer states that “to
exempt the obligor, the impediment has to be an objective one, having its roots
outside the sphere of influence of the obligor.” ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 47, at
1072.
103
CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
104
Take into account, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
102
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which begins to function where the parties fail to agree.105
Therefore, what is relevant here is the reasonable expectation of
those who have not specifically agreed on the matter. In this
hypothetical, a “reasonable person” could not expect Seller to have
taken the impediment into account. So long as Seller could not
have taken the sinking ship into account, a “reasonable person”
could not have expected Seller to have avoided it or its
consequences.106 No one could be expected to avoid what is
unforeseeable and unlikely.
The remaining part of Article 79(1)—“could not
reasonably be expected to . . . overcome it or its
consequences”107—is vital for the solution to this case. One of the
consequences is the extreme difficulty of salvaging the ship and
rescuing the painting from it. On the issue of whether Seller is
required to carry out such an enterprise, this author agrees with
Professor Lindström when he writes:
Routamo and Ramberg point out that
absolute impossibility cannot be a
requirement for exemption but that
the question is what a party
reasonably can overcome. As an
example, the scholars state that it
cannot be regarded as reasonable to
require a party to save a plane that
lays 100 meters below sea
level. Such an impediment would be
possible to overcome but the
105
CISG, supra note 1, art. 6. (“The parties may exclude the
application of this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the
effect of any of its provisions.”).
106
There may be some cases where a failing party could not reasonably
be expected to have taken an impediment into account, but could reasonably be
expected to have avoided its consequence. For example, a seller can avoid a
consequence of the sky-rocketed price of an input for his products by obtaining
substitute materials or by ensuring price stability using futures or options.
107
CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
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scholars regard such an operation as
unreasonably expensive. . . . The
wording of Article 79 does not
suggest that a party would be obliged
to
take
on
extraordinary
responsibilities in order to perform.
On the contrary, if the word
“reasonably” in Article 79 also
regards the obligation to overcome
the impediment, Article 79 only
obligates a party to make a
reasonable effort to perform.108
Rescuing the painting may be technically possible, but
Seller must bear huge costs totally disproportionate to the price of
the painting, and will suffer a financial loss that is significantly
greater than the risk of loss that a “reasonable person” could expect
Seller to have undertaken.109 It can also be regarded as an
“economically irrational behavior”110 to force Seller to salvage the
ship. Therefore, a “reasonable person” could not expect him to
overcome such a difficulty. Thus, all of the conditions of Article

108

Lindström, supra note 90, at 13 (emphasis added).
Professor Eisenberg has advanced a test called the “bounded-risk
test,” under which “a promisor should be entitled to judicial relief if as a result
of a dramatic and unexpected rise in costs, performance would result in a
financial loss significantly greater than the risk of loss that the parties would
reasonably have expected the promisor to have undertaken.” See Eisenberg,
supra note 81, at 234.
110
Professor Atamer is also standing on the premise that Article 79
admits a specific performance claim but considers a claim for an “economically
irrational behavior” as an exception, insisting that “[w]henever there is a blatant
disproportion between the changed costs of performance and the interest of the
buyer in receiving performance in kind，the seller ought to have the right to
refuse a performance claim. What has to be done is a cost-benefit analysis. Each
time one comes to the result that a claim for specific performance would be
vexatious，the seller should have a defense.” ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 36, at
1068.
109
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79(1) are met. Accordingly, Seller is exempted from his obligation
to perform and from Buyer’s claim for damages.111
C. The Devalued Currency Case and Adaptation by the Reasonable
Expectation Test

The second so-called “hardship” case is a devalued
currency case.
Buyer, domiciled in State X, concluded a contract of sale
with Seller, domiciled in State Y. Payment was agreed to be made
in State Z within three months, upon delivery of the goods, in the
currency of State Z (Z currency). The price was 50,000 in Z
currency. Its value was equivalent to approximately 30 kilograms
of gold. Suppose further that within a month of the conclusion of
the contract an unpredictable political and economic crisis, which
the parties could not have reasonably taken into account, led to a
massive devaluation of 50% of Z currency. This has caused the
value of the contract price to plunge by half. Now the value of
50,000 in Z currency has become equivalent to no more than
approximately 15 kilograms of gold. As a result of this totally
unanticipated and massive devaluation of the Z currency, the sale
has turned out to be a huge windfall for Buyer and a gross loss for
Seller.112
The performance by Seller, i.e., to procure the goods and
deliver them to Buyer, is as possible as ever without any physical
obstacle. Because of the massive devaluation of Z currency,
Of course, as Professor Tallon points out, “the final solution will not
be the same if the said object is a highly valuable sculpture or merely a machine
tool. Thus, everything is a question of measure.” A sculpture made by Auguste
Rodin would be worth salvage. In case of a machine tool, even if specially made
according to the specifications by Buyer, the cost of making another may not be
so high as to warrant salvage, and may be something Seller is “reasonably
expected to overcome.” See Tallon, supra note 16, ¶ 2.6.4, at 582.
112
This hypothetical case is based on the example in AC Opinion,
supra note 71, cmt. 33. In the Comment, “buyer A” is probably misprinted for
“seller B” and vice versa.
111
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however, the transaction has become impracticable for Seller as it
would cause him a substantial financial loss if he were forced to
carry it out. When we apply Article 79 to this case, the economy
of State Z was “beyond control” for Seller as much as it was for
anybody else. The economic crisis that triggered the devaluation
was unpredictable by definition. Hence, the parties shared a tacit
assumption that Z currency would be stable at least during the life
of their contract. Accordingly, Seller “could not reasonably be
expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of
the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided [it].”113
So far, there is an inclination to exempt Seller. However, it
would not be reasonable for both parties to put an end to their deal.
Seller, as well as Buyer, may not be happy with this ending. Let’s
consider what the best solution that a “reasonable person” can
come up with is. A “reasonable person” in Buyer’s shoes might
simply forgo the windfall, thinking that he has not borne
comparable quid pro quo.114 If so, it is likely that he would like the
transaction to stay on if he can obtain the profit that he had
originally contemplated. On the other hand, Seller would also
most likely want the deal to continue if he can glean the proceeds
of the sale which he had originally attempted to earn. Z currency
in their original undertaking was worth double of that after the
devaluation. It would be reasonable for them to agree to modify
their contract by increasing the price to 100,000 in new Z
currency—the equivalent of 50,000 in old Z currency. If Seller
simply eludes the contract, he must search for a bargain with
another buyer from scratch, on terms which may or may not be
more favorable than the eluded contract. Buyer, on the other hand,
must procure the goods from another seller on terms which may or
113

CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1); see AC Opinion, supra note 71, cmt.
39 (“Indeed, the theoretical possibility of such radical and unexpected changes
admits the application of Article 79 in those rare instances as the one
exemplified above.”).
114
Of course, an actual breathing party will insist on the performance
of the contract to the letter, trying to obtain the windfall, but as explained later in
this section, this should be blocked.
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may not be more favorable. In addition, negotiating for and
concluding a new contact with other dealers would most likely take
more time and trouble than the rearrangement of the contract
already consolidated.
This is probably the most practical and reasonable solution,
which will give both parties what they have wanted from the
beginning, no more and no less. A judge deciding such a case
could reach this solution partly through Article 8(1), which
provides: “[f]or the purposes of this Convention statements made
by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to
his intent where the other party knew or could not have been
unaware what that intent was.”115 A superb illustration by
Professor Farnworth is pertinent to our current discussion:
One consequence of paragraph (1)
[of Article 8] is that if the parties
shared a common understanding of
the meaning of language or other
conduct, that understanding will
prevail. . . . If, for example, a seller
agrees with a buyer to show a price
of 50,000 in the contract, rather than
the true price of 100,000, in order to
reduce the broker’s fees, their
contract will be interpreted according
to their common understanding,

115

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3
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100,000 not 50,000.116
In our hypothetical, both parties agreed that Seller’s
performance was worth 50,000 in old Z currency or approximately
30 kilograms of gold, and intended to sell and buy it at that fixed
valuation. Each “knew or could not have been unaware” of the
other’s intent. After the devaluation, the rate of 50,000 Z currency
has plummeted down to the equivalent of approximately 15
kilograms of gold. Therefore, in order to maintain the originally
intended value of the performance, the contract price must be
increased to 100,000 in new Z currency. If they had foreseen the
devaluation and addressed the issue at the time of the conclusion of
the contract, they would probably have agreed on this sum.117
The interpretation of the parties’ intent must be linked to
the “reasonable expectation test” of Article 79(1), because, as
Professor Farnsworth’s exemplar shows, an Article 8(1) case does
not usually involve an unexpected impediment. Allowing Buyer to
pay only 50,000 in new Z currency is unreasonable and unfair
because it is not what the parties really intended, and because it is a
sheer windfall to Buyer and a substantial financial loss to Seller.
116

E. Allen Farnsworth, Interpretation of Contract: Article 8, in C.M.
BIANCA ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980
VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 95, 98 (1987); see also United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, [1978] IX Y.B. Comm’n on Int’l
Trade 97, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1978; see also BGH Nov. 27, 2007, X ZR
111/04, translated in Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, CISG Case
Presentation,
PACE
L.
SCH.
INST.
INT’L
COM.
L.,
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071127g1.html (last updated June 6, 2013)
(The case concerns a buyer who proposed to the seller price increases to prevent
buyer’s customers from finding out actual cost price. The price increment was to
be skimmed off and transferred to a company affiliated with the buyer as
“consulting and marketing fees.” The German Court held pursuant to Article
8(1) of the CISG that the real intent of the price amendment proposed by the
buyer was known to the seller, or the latter could not have been unaware of it.).
117
Professor Eisenberg rightly pointed out that “unspecified terms are
usually determined on the basis of what the contracting parties probably would
have agreed to if they had addressed the relevant issue.” See Eisenberg, supra
note 81, at 214.
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Therefore, Seller “could not reasonably be expected to overcome
the impediment”118 by performing the contract to the letter.
However, he should not be exempted, because he could reasonably
overcome the impediment by the solution mentioned above by
applying Article 8(1). Buyer, who may persist in obtaining the
goods at half the price, may reject this solution. However, if he
does reject, the court will hold that Seller is exempted from
performance, because a “reasonable person” could not expect
Seller to overcome the impediment by accepting the payment
which has only half the value of the original contract. If Seller is
exempted, Buyer must obtain the goods from the market probably
at roughly the same price fixed in the court order.
To order Buyer to pay 100,000 instead of 50,000 in Z
currency is the same solution as adaptation of the contract, at least
as far as its face value is concerned. Unlike the UNIDROIT
Principles, the CISG has no provision that authorizes a judge to
adapt the contract. However, such adaptation should be possible
through the interpretation of the “reasonable expectation test” of
Article 79, as demonstrated above. Whether a party could
reasonably be expected to overcome an impediment, in other
words, whether a “reasonable person” could expect a party to
overcome an impediment, is ultimately determined by a judge
presiding over the case. By this capacity of an umpire of
reasonableness, a judge can adapt a contract by ordering a solution
reasonably expected to be taken.
It is impracticable and even a waste of time to order the
parties to renegotiate, because it is likely that they had already
negotiated extensively before going to court.
D. The Drastic Price Increase Case and the “Eisenberg Formula”

On September 1, Buyer and Seller had entered into a sales
contract of certain type of steel tubes, which were to be used by

118

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol30/iss2/3

CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).

42

ARTICLE 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

8/20/2018 12:47 PM

CISG Article 79

373

Buyer to make scaffolding, at the price of 100,000 Euro. On
September 30, the price of steel materials used for manufacturing
the tubes increased by 70%. Seller suspended performance and
did not deliver the tubes, but instead asked Buyer for an
adjustment to the price. When negotiations failed, Seller declared
that he would not make deliveries unless Buyer agreed to price
increase. Buyer did not agree and sought a court order requiring
Seller to make deliveries at the price specified in the contract of
100,000 Euro.119
It is clear that the rise of steel price is “beyond control” of
Seller, as well as anybody else. However, it is not so clear whether
Seller “could not reasonably be expected to have taken [it] into
account at the time of the conclusion of the contract.”120 Our
“reasonable expectation test” inquires whether a “reasonable
person” in Seller’s shoes could expect Seller to have taken the
price hike into account. If the answer is affirmative—in other
words, if the price increase stays within the reasonably expected
level—he is liable for specific performance or expectation
damages. However, the scale of a reasonably expected price
increase will sway widely depending on many, or probably
infinite, variables, such as whether the transaction is of speculative
nature, whether the goods are steel or farm products, whether the
life of contract is long, or whether a proper market forecast is
available. In some speculative trades, parties might foresee a 70%
price increase or even more. Pinpointing the percentage that is
uniformly applicable to all sorts of transactions in a reasonable
manner is impossible. If the matter is “left to the discretion of the

119
This hypothetical is based on Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of
Cassation],
June
19,
2009,
C.07.0289.N,
http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?id=1457 (Belg.), translated in Albert H.
Kritzer CISG Database, CISG Case Presentation, PACE L. SCH. INST. INT’L
COM. L., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090619b1.html (last updated June
25, 2012). Professor Flechtner rightly criticized this opinion as wrongfully
incorporating the UNIDROIT Principles into the general principles of the
CISG. See Flechtner, supra note 3, at 91-99.
120
CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
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courts,”121 judges will be at a loss. Professor Eisenberg, however,
has found a solution:
What constitutes a reasonably
foreseeable increase in the seller’s
cost of performance should be
historically based; more specifically,
it should be the maximum
percentage increase in the cost of the
relevant inputs over a comparable
stretch of time during a reasonable
past period.
In most cases,
consideration of price movements
during the prior ten to twenty years
probably would suffice.122
This author calls this test the “Eisenberg Formula.” It is far
more rational and versatile than any fixed static percentage, often
discussed under the name of “limit of sacrifice.”123 It is rational
because it sophisticates crude statements concerning risk-bearing,
for example, an argument that sellers in speculative businesses are
regarded as bearing the risk of fluctuations. The “Eisenberg
Formula” refines those statements and provides a rational answer
to the question of when and how much a party should bear the risk.
It is versatile because it can be applied to all kinds of transactions

121

ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 82, at 1090.
Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 245.
123
See, e.g., ATAMER, supra note 15, ¶ 82, at 1090; see also
CHRISTOPH BRUNNER, FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP UNDER GENERAL
CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: EXEMPTION OF NON-PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL
428-38 (Kluwer L. Int’l. 2009) (suggesting that, as a general point of reference,
100% increase is favored); see also Schwenzer, supra note 89, at 715-17
(arguing that a 150-200 % margin is advisable, taking account of the
international character of the transaction). Note that the concept of limit of
sacrifice is related not only to the phase of “taking account of the impediment,”
but also to the phase of “overcoming it,” which will be discussed in the rest of
this article.
122
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with equal validity, regardless of their kinds, natures, lengths, or
the types of goods.
In applying the “Eisenberg Formula” to the present
hypothetical, we must research the fluctuation of the market prices
of steel materials used for producing the tubes during the ten to
twenty years before the conclusion of the contract, and identify the
maximum percentage of price increase “over a comparable stretch
of time,” that is, one month—from September 1 to September 30.
Let’s assume that the maximum percentage of steel price increase
in a month during the past ten years is 90%. Thus, the 70%
increase that took place in the hypothetical is below that
percentage and, therefore, a “reasonable person” could expect
Seller to have taken the price spike into account. One critical
condition of Article 79(1) is not met.124 Accordingly, Seller is not
exempted and is obliged to perform the contract to the letter, or
pay expectation damages to Buyer.125 It is notable that the 70%
increase of the cost that Seller is ordered to bear is still below the
reasonably expected level, i.e., 90%.
On the other hand, if 70% is beyond the maximum
percentage of the “Eisenberg Formula,” for example 50%, a
“reasonable person” could not expect Seller to have taken a 70%
increase into account. However, this does not exempt Seller yet,
because we must further ask whether he “could reasonably be
expected to . . . overcome an impediment,”126 even where he could
not reasonably be expected to have taken it into account at the time
of the conclusion of the contract. This is the logical reading of
Article 79(1), because even if an impediment beyond control was
not taken into account, Seller still could do something to overcome
its consequences after it happened to him. The consequence to
124

All of the conditions enumerated in Article 79(1) must be fulfilled
for the exemption to apply.
125
This would not be a windfall for Buyer, because in this hypothetical
Buyer himself uses the tubes delivered by Seller or must obtain them from the
market at the higher price.
126
CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(1).
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overcome is a 70% increase in the cost of the steel materials. It is
true that if Seller decides to bear all the increase, he could certainly
overcome it. However, needless to say, the question is whether he
could reasonably be expected to.
Let’s assume that the market price of the tubes of the same
type has increased127 by about 45%.128 One simple solution would
be complete exemption of Seller, because the steel price increase
(70%) is above the reasonably expected level (50%). In this case,
he would sell the tubes in the market at the price approximately
45% higher than the contract price, and probably make some
profit. On the other hand, Buyer would have to buy the tubes from
the market at the price approximately 45% higher than the contract
price. This solution imposes all the increased cost on Buyer and
none on Seller. At the other end of the scale is the solution that
Seller bears all the increases. Unlike the hypothetical of the

Professor Eisenberg explains: “Cases in which the seller’s cost of
performance unexpectedly rises above the contract price often, perhaps usually,
involve a cost increase that is market-wide. In such cases, the increase normally
will raise not only the seller’s costs but also the buyer’s value for, and the
market value of, the contracted-for commodity.” See Eisenberg, supra note 81,
at 238 (emphasis added). Criticizing his bounded-risk test, Professor Goldberg
writes about cases where the rise of the input cost was not correlated with the
price increase of the product. This may be so, especially where the input and/or
product have substitute goods, and there may a time-lag between the price
increase of inputs and final products. Professor Eisenberg, however, states
“often, perhaps usually.” In order to legitimately refute his rationale, Professor
Goldberg must prove that it is unusual that an unexpected rise of the seller’s cost
of performance should involve a market-wide price increase. It does not seem
that he has proved it. See Victor Goldberg, Excuse Doctrine: The Eisenberg
Uncertainty Principle, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 359, 369-78 (2010).
128
The original market price of the tubes includes other costs than steel
materials and the profit. A 70% rise of the price of steel materials does not
usually lead to a 70% rise of the tube price. In addition, the sellers may reduce
their profit to make the changed price more acceptable to the buyers at the time
of abrupt price hike. In actual cases, the market price of the product will usually
increase at lower rate than 70%. As such, the hypothetical’s rate is set to 45%.
127
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sunken ship above, this is not an “event-oriented”129 case, and
there is no need for “all or nothing” approach. What is required
here is a numerical determination in the graduation of successive
figures. The word “reasonable” has affinity with a question of
degree: where to draw the dividing line in the gamut of the
continuum of increase. Seller should bear the extra cost to the
extent of the maximum price increase percentage identified by the
“Eisenberg Formula,” namely to 50%, which is what he could
reasonably be expected to have taken into account. Seller should
give up any profit included in the original contract price. Because
even if Seller bears 50%, Buyer must also bear some portion of the
increase, and a “reasonable person” could not expect Seller to
make profit in sacrifice of Buyer. A hypothetical rough calculation
of the sums that each party must bear can be made in the following
manner. The original contract price of 100,000 Euro includes
70,000 for steel materials, 20,000 for other costs, and 10,000 for
profit. A 70% increase of steel price makes the contract price go
up to 149,000 ([70,000×1.7]＋20,000＋10,000). Seller bears the
cost of 50% increase of steel price, which is 35,000 (70,000×0.5),
and other costs. Seller also must give up his profit. So Seller’s
total cost is 125,000 Euro (70,000＋35,000＋20,000). On the
other hand, Buyer must bear the cost of 20% (70%－50%) increase
of steel price and other costs. So Buyer must pay 104,000 Euro
([70,000×1.2]＋20,000), which is 4,000 Euro more than the
original price. Seller suffers a loss of 21,000 Euro.
If Buyer persists in paying no more than the contract price
of 100,000 Euro, Seller would be obliged to incur more loss than
he could reasonably be expected to bear, and, therefore, would be
129
See Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 241. (“Typical shared-assumption
cases are event-oriented, in the sense that the issue is whether the occurrence of
a discrete event entitles the adversely affected party to judicial relief. If it does,
then usually the relief should consist of an excuse of that party’s obligation to
perform, although in some cases the relief may consist only of excusing liability
for expectation damages. In contrast, the typical bounded-risk case is
magnitude-oriented, in the sense that the issue is whether the adversely affected
party’s dramatically increased cost of performance entitles it to judicial relief.”)
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exempted, which means Buyer would have to obtain the goods in
the market, probably at a price 45% higher than the original price,
or 41,000 Euro ([100,000×1.45]－104,000) more than the
modified price.
On the other hand, Seller may not be allowed to leave the
courtroom free from the contract with some prospect to make
profit by selling to another, simply because the price spike is above
his reasonable expectation. This is what the word “overcome”
implies.
VI.

JUDGES’ CAPACITY TO ADAPT THE CONTRACT UNDER THE CISG

Professor Schlechtriem once dared to state:
But if you ask me whether there is
somewhere in the Convention the
principle of adjustment or adaptation
of contracts, I would put forward a
very provoking argument. I think
the remedy of price reduction in
Article 50 of the Convention is a
kind of adjustment of the contract to
reflect a disturbed balance between
performance on one side and
obligation on the other side. The
defects in goods, or nonconformities
on the goods, constitute a
disturbance of the equilibrium or
balance
of
the
exchanged
performances. That is why we
defended price reduction -- as a just
instrument
for
adjusting
the
disturbed
balance
of
performances. . . . [Y]ou could use
this principle as a springboard to
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develop a general rule of adjustment
in hardship cases.130
There has always been antagonism to “a judge rewriting
our contract,” and probably there will be similar hostility to
adaptation through the “reasonable expectation test.” However, it
is the very function of the CISG to interpret and supplement what
parties have expressly agreed to. In this sense, a judge applying
the CISG always rewrites or supplements a contract. This is all the
more true of the provisions with the word “reasonable” in their
texts. For example, Article 39(1) provides: “The buyer loses the
right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not
give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack of
conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or
ought to have discovered it.”131 If in a case involving a 40-day
delay of notice of a non-conformity, a judge holds that a
“reasonable time” of Article 39(1) is within one month and denies
the buyer’s claim for damages, he is practically adding in the
contract a clause providing: “The buyer shall lose his right to claim
concerning any non-conformity if he fails to notify the seller of it
within one month.”132
Another example is Article 60, which uses a phrase similar
to Article 79(1): “The buyer’s obligation to take delivery consists:
(a) in doing all the acts which could reasonably be expected of him

130

Harry M. Flechtner, Transcript of a Workshop on the Sales
Convention: Leading CISG Scholars Discuss Contract Formation, Validity,
Excuse for Hardship, Avoidance, Nachfrist, Contract Interpretation, Parol
Evidence, Analogical Application, and Much More, 18 J. L. & Com. 191, 238
(1999).
131
CISG, supra note 1, art. 39(1).
132
See Ingeborg Schwenzer, The Noble Month (Articles 38, 39 CISG)-The Story Behind the Scenery, 7 EUR. J. L. REFORM, 353-66 (2006); see also
Ishida, supra note 57, at 8-15 (arguing that if the buyer’s notice of noncompliance is made to the seller within a month, it is presumed to be made
within a reasonable time under Article 39(1), and that the presumption can be
rebutted by the seller proving a prejudice caused by the delay).

49

ARTICLE 3 (DO NOT DELETE)

380

PACE INT’L L. REV.

8/20/2018 12:47 PM

[Vol. XXX] 2N

in order to enable the seller to make delivery.”133 In a China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
(“CIETAC”) case which applied Article 60(a), it was held that the
buyer was reasonably expected to dispense with an inspection not
specified in the contract and to send a ship to the loading place.134
What this award did is no less than modifying the contract.
A court sometimes even vindicates the existence of a
contract by utilizing the “reasonable person” standard of Article
8(2). When a party negates the existence of a binding contract, the
court, by pointing at certain conducts of his, concludes that “a
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have .
. . in the same circumstances”135 understood the conducts as
making a binding contract. In one case, a Switzerland district
court found that the conclusion of the contract, the buyer’s
intention to be bound, and the definite quantity of goods to be sold
could be deduced from the buyer’s request to the seller to issue an
invoice for goods already delivered.136 This case suggests that a
court sometimes “writes” a contract.
Taking account of these extensive powers granted to judges
by the CISG, it would not be a deviation from the language of the
Convention for them to adapt the contract based on the “reasonable
expectation test” of Article 79(1), particularly when they deal with
an unexpected skyrocketing price beyond once-in-decade increase.
It far better serves the integrity of the CISG than resorting to other
laws, such as the UNIDROIT Principles. It might be their duty to
make adaptation within the realm of interpretation of the CISG
under the command of Article 7(1) “to promote uniformity in its
133

CISG, supra note 1, art. 60.
Mung Bean Case, CISG/2001/02, China International Economic &
Trade Arbitration Commission [CIETAC] (PRC) (Mar. 22, 2001), translated in
Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, CISG Case Presentation, PACE L. SCH. INST.
INT’L COM. L., http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/010322c1.html (last updated
Oct. 22, 2010).
135
CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
136
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] July 3, 1997, 125
Entscheidungen des schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [BGE] I 96 (Switz.).
134
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application and the observance of good faith in international
trade.”137
VII.

CONCLUSION

This article has demonstrated following three theses.
First, Article 79 exempts a failing party from his obligation
to perform. This is the most natural interpretation of Article 79,
and the contrary conventional views have impliedly acknowledged
it. This author earnestly hopes that a judge applying Article 79
will not have a hard time reaching the conclusion that it exempts
performance. This author also wishes that in the future, a judge
could simply and straightforwardly hold: “It is one of the basic
principles of Article 79 that specific performance claims are barred
if the conditions enumerated in paragraph (1) are satisfied.”
Second, in a case where a dramatic and unexpected rise in
the costs of performance radically changes the equilibrium of the
contract, the extent of reasonably expected increase should be
determined by the “Eisenberg Formula,” which identifies the
maximum percentage increase in the cost of the relevant inputs
over a comparable stretch of time during the prior ten to twenty
years.138 If the actual increase is below the maximum level, the
seller is not exempted, and is obliged to perform or to pay
expectation damages to the buyer. If it is beyond the maximum
level, the seller is expected and hence obliged to overcome the
increase by bearing the cost up to the level.
Third, it is business as usual for judges to rewrite, adapt, or
supplement a contract. Although the CISG has no provision
explicitly authorizing a judge to do so, Article 79 itself
presupposes such capacities of a judge. A judge can adapt a
contract through the interpretation of the reasonable expectation
expressly incorporated in Article 79(1). In the future, in solving a
137
138

CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 245.
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so-called “hardship” case, he should never invoke the domestic law
of his state, nor resort to such other soft laws as the UNIDROIT
Principles. He is recommended to straightforwardly hold: “The
contracts governed by Article 79 of the CISG can be adapted or
modified through the interpretation of the reasonable expectation
provided therein.”
The author wishes this article would save time for judges
presiding over Article 79 cases, who might not be very familiar
with the Convention, and who could not spare sufficient time for a
case, overwhelmed by caseloads. This author also sincerely hopes
that legal scholars of the CISG all over the world will acknowledge
that Article 79 allows for adaptation or modification of contracts.
It has been thirty years since the CISG took effect, and it is high
time the controversies—“sound and fury”—over the “hardship”
situations and adaptation of contracts were settled.
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